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1.  Introduction 
  One of the games most extensively studied in the literature in recent years is the 
ultimatum game. The reason that this game is so intriguing seems to be that the 
game-theoretic analysis is straightforward and simple, while the overwhelming experimental 
evidence is equally straightforward but at odds with the game-theoretic analysis (see, e.g., 
Güth et al. [1982], Güth & Tietz [1990], or Thaler [1988]). 
  In the basic ultimatum game there are two players and a pie. Player A proposes how 
to split the pie between herself and player B. Upon receiving player A's proposal, player B 
has two options. First, to accept the proposal, which will then be carried out. Second, to 
reject it, after which both get nothing. Many variants of this basic setup have been 
considered in the literature. There are many Nash equilibria in this game. Every strategy for 
player A combined with any strategy for player B that accepts that offer but rejects all lower 
offers is one. But there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium: player A offers the minimal 
piece, and player B accepts that.
1 
  Empirical evidence shows time and again that this is not what happens in the 
laboratory. Players A usually offer somewhat less than half the pie to players B, and players 
B usually reject small offers. Concerning player A's behavior, there are two main 
explanations for this anomaly offered in the literature. First, some argued that fairness and 
reciprocity considerations are the force driving players A to offer more than the standard 
game-theoretic analysis would suggest (see, e.g., Forsythe et al. [1994]). An alternative 
explanation found in the literature is that players A are basically following an adaptive, 
best-reply seeking approach to the behavior of players B. In a multi-period setup where 
players played the game repeatedly but each time against different players, some papers 
showed how it can happen that players A `unlearn' to play the subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategy as players B have not learned yet that they should play their perfect equilibrium 
strategy. Once players A do not play that strategy anymore, players B will never learn to play 
theirs. Such learning dynamics are shown in Roth & Erev [1995] who follow a reinforcement 
learning approach, and Gale et al. [1995] who use replicator dynamics. 
  Both explanations are somehow based on the assumption that players A learn to play 
best-replies to the behavior of players B. The deviation from the predictions of subgame 
 
     1 Strictly speaking, in case it is a discrete choice problem including zero, there are two subgame 
perfect equilibria, with player A offering either zero or the smallest possible strictly positive piece to 
player B.  3 
   
                    
perfect Nash equilibrium is, therefore, mainly explained by deviating behavior of players B. 
Players A only react on this deviation which is caused by a slow learning process or fairness 
considerations. In this paper, in contrast, we will show that the adaptive behavior of players A 
as such may also cause deviations from the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, keeping 
players A away from the optimal minimal offer independent from the adaptive behavior of 
players B.
2 
  In order to focus on the behavior of players A, we design an ultimatum game 
experiment in which the behavior of a large population of players B is fixed by some 
computer algorithm. This was known to the players. Our experimental design has two 
advantages. First, as there are no payoffs to other people influenced by the behavior of 
players A, fairness considerations cannot play a role. Second, learning in ultimatum games is 
essentially a coevolutionary process. Players learn about the behavior of other players who 
learn about the behavior of other players who learn .... Our experimental design allows to 
focus on the learning behavior of players A, abstracting from the complications and 
peculiarities related to coevolutionary processes.
3 
  Basically, the problem faced by a player A is a multi-armed bandit problem. There are 
three treatments that differ in the general level of acceptance rates. The experimental 
parameters in each treatment are such that two monotonicity properties are satisfied: higher 
offers are more likely to be accepted, whereas lower offers are giving higher expected 
payoffs to the proposer. 
  Two stylized facts stand out in the experimental data. First, although the experiment 
comprises 100 periods, there is only little tendency for the average offer to come down to the 
minimal offer, the one that maximizes a proposer's expected payoff. Second, although the 
incentive structure of the proposers is the same in each treatment, higher general 
acceptance rates lead to significantly lower offers. 
  We consider a range of learning theories, from optimal learning (based on the Gittins 
index) to more boundedly rational learning methods. We show that both stylized facts can be 
 
     2  Vriend [1997] presented some theoretical considerations why paying more attention to the 
behavior of the proposing players as such could be worthwhile. 
     3 Our approach is similar in spirit to a dictator game (see, e.g., Bolton et al. [1998]), in the sense 
that dictator games were also invented to cut out players B. But there are two advantages of our 
setup. First, in a dictator game players A know the behavior of players B (accepting anything), 
whereas this is not the case in our setup. Second, in a dictator game fairness considerations still play 
a role.  4 
   
explained by these learning theories. In other words, having imposed strict experimental 
control on the behavior of the receiving players, we show that one should not expect 
convergence to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in standard ultimatum games. One of 
the main contributions of our paper, then, is that this offers an explanation for the lack of 
convergence to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in ultimatum games, an explanation 
that complements most existing explanations. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the 
experimental design, and in section 3 the experimental results. Various learning theories to 
explain the experimental data are discussed in section 4, and their predicted dynamics are 
examined in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Experimental design 
  The underlying idea for our design is the following. First, we wanted to set up a 
stylized ultimatum game in which the optimal strategy for players A would coincide with the 
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the standard ultimatum game of offering only a 
minimal slice. Second, as we wanted to focus on players A's learning behavior, we wanted to 
be in a position to exclude as much as possible other well-known explanations for players A 
staying away from the optimal action. In particular, this implies that we needed to be in a 
position to abstract from the learning behavior of the receiving players B. 
  We play an ultimatum game in which the pie has size 9, and we allow only integers 
from 1 to 9 to be chosen as offers (see also Roth & Erev [1995]). The experimental subjects 
are players A, who play against players B who form a large population of artificial agents, 
making their decisions using some computer algorithm. Every period a given player A is 
randomly matched with a player B that he has not met yet. Player A enters his offer, and then 
the reply of player B and the corresponding payoff for player A are shown. There are 100 
periods to be played. Notice that this is more periods than in experimental ultimatum games 
typically reported in the literature. Figure 1 shows a player's screen during the experiment. A 
player could at any moment during the experiment scroll through his complete history. The 
identity of players B is listed on the screen to make clear that every period the opponent is a 
different player. Each period, after the choice of player A, it takes 5 to 15 seconds (uniform 
randomly chosen) before the reply of player B is listed (saying "please wait for reply player 
B"). This suggests players B make serious choices, and it avoids players A getting rushed  5 
   
                    
too much by the speed of players B. 
 
 
 ROUND  2 
 
  Your opponent is player B with id.: 649,021 
 
  Please choose your offer to player B:   . . . .    and press Enter 
 
 HISTORY 
 
  period   id. player B  your offer  reply player B    your payoff 
 
1   231,896  2   accept    7 
 
Figure 1.  Sample interface during experiment 
 
Using artificial players B allows us to control the environment for players A. Players A is told 
that players B are artificial players. Given that the players B are artificial players, altruism 
considerations are irrelevant. We told players A: “Each of those players B's behavior is 
systematic in the following sense: If a specific player B has accepted an offer x then that 
player B would have accepted as well any offer greater than x. And if offer x had been 
rejected by that player B, so would have been all offers smaller than x. Of course, different 
players B might have different opinions about which offers are acceptable or not. The players 
B do not change their behavior over time” (see instructions in the appendix). As a result, the 
population of players B can be characterized by a probability density function that a given 
offer will be accepted. The probability that a given offer is accepted is monotonically 
increasing in the size of the offer.
4 We organize three treatments, that differ in the general 
 
     4  Hence, in our experiment there is a heterogeneous population of players B who play pure 
strategies characterized by a reservation value property. That is, every player B has a reservation 
value, but different players may have different values. An alternative possible interpretation 
concerning the population of players B is that the population consists of identical players who use a 
mixed strategy characterized by probabilities of accepting offers that are monotonically increasing in 
the size of the offer.  6 
   
level of acceptance probabilities. The probabilities that a randomly chosen player B will 
accept a given offer in each treatment is listed in Table 1.  
 
 
   o f f e r s  
  treatment  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
  ult3    0.30 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.64 1.00 1.00 
  ult5    0.50 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  ult7    0.70 0.72 0.76 0.82 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Table 1.  Acceptance probabilities 
 
These probabilities are based on the following considerations. First, the expected payoff 
maximizing offer is 1, which coincides with the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of a 
standard ultimatum game. Second, the acceptance probabilities increase monotonically with 
the size of the offer, thus maintaining realistic assumptions concerning the behavior of 
players B. Third, given the two considerations already mentioned, we wanted to make the 
learning task as easy as possible. Therefore, the minimal offer of 1 gives an expected payoff 
that is clearly higher than for any other possible offer. Moreover, there are no local optima in 
the strategy space of players A. This avoids that many adaptive modes of behavior can be 
locked in too easily at sub-optimal peaks in the range of possible offers. Starting from the 
minimal offer of 1, in each treatment each next higher offer gives an expected payoff that is 
at least 10% lower. Figure 2 shows these resulting expected payoffs for each treatment.  7 
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Figure 2.  Expected payoffs across treatments 
 
The experiments were conducted in the computerized experimental laboratory CEEL of the 
University of Trento in November 1997. With only a few exceptions, all players for a given 
treatment were simultaneously in the laboratory. The players, 19 for the ult3 treatment and 
20 for the other treatments, went through the experiment in about an hour. The exchange 
rates (Italian Lires per point) were 83.3 (for ult3), 50.0 (ult5), and 35.7 (ult7). These exchange 
rates were chosen such that the monetary incentives were essentially identical in each 
treatment. The only differences are due to rounding, and to the fact that the acceptance 
probabilities cannot exceed 1, which is of relevance only for some of the highest offers in 
some treatments. The average monetary reward was just over Lit. 15,000 per player (about 
US $ 8.80 at the time). 
 
 
3.  Experimental data 
  Figure 3 presents the time-series of the offers averaged over the players in each of 
the three treatments.  8 
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Figure 3.  Average offers in ultimatum game experiment 
 
We observe the following. First, in each treatment the average initial offer is about 4, slightly 
below the 50% offer. Second, from period 10 to 90, the average offers in each treatment 
decline significantly but slowly,
5 and in none of the treatments do the players learn to make 
the optimal offer of 1 (although there is a downward end effect, in particular in the treatments 
ult3 and ult5).
6 Third, although the monetary incentives were the same in each treatment, 
there is a systematic difference across treatments, with higher acceptance probabilities 
leading to lower offers.
7 These differences emerge in particular during the first 10 periods. 
 
 
     5 A simple regression against time gives coefficients of -0.012, -0.004 and -0.004 for the ult3, ult5 
and ult7 treatments respectively (all significant at 0.005; 1-sided). Extrapolation of the observed 
rates implies that it would take hundreds of periods more in each treatment for the average offer to 
reach 1. 
     6 Such end effects are relatively common in experiments. 
     7 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, based on the average offer for each individual player over the 100 
periods of the experiment, shows that the players offer significantly more in the ult3 than the players 
in the ult5 treatment, who in turn offer significantly more than those in the ult7 treatment (at 0.005 
significance level; 1-sided). 
  9 
   
 
4. Some learning theories 
  In this section we present a number of learning theories that might help to explain 
the experimental observations. 
 
4.1 Modeling rational learning 
  As explained above, in our experimental design we simplified the standard 
ultimatum game into a one-person decision problem. This decision problem in our 
experiment resembles a multi-armed bandit. For many specific kinds of repeated multi-
armed bandit situations optimal behaviors are given in the literature (see, e.g., Gittins 
[1989], Bergemann & Välimäki [2001] and Brezzi & Lai [2002]). One standard multi-armed 
bandit situation is characterized by people knowing the value of the payoffs, πi, that they 
might receive with each of the arms i. They also know in this situation that they receive 
each payoff with a fixed but unknown probability pi. If, in addition, the probabilities pi are 
independent of each other, the Gittins index can be used to determine the optimal 
behavior. 
 The  Gittins index has been introduced by Gittins [1979, 1989]. It assigns at each 
time to each arm the maximal average payoff that can be obtained by repeatedly choosing 
that arm for an event-dependent number of times. Each time an arm is chosen, it is 
determined randomly, according to the probability assigned to the arm, whether a payoff is 
obtained or not. After each choice it is decided, depending on the experience with this arm, 
whether the arm is chosen again or not. How this decision is made is called the stopping 
rule. Many different stopping rules can be imagined. If we consider the time span from the 
actual time t until the time at which the choice is changed because of the stopping rule, the 
average payoff that is received within this time span can be calculated. This average 
payoff depends on the stopping rule. The Gittins index is defined as the maximal average 
payoff that can be reached by any stopping rule. We denote the Gittins index for arm i at 
time t by gi(t). To calculate the average payoffs for each stopping rule it is necessary to 
calculate the probability for obtaining a payoff at each time. Since the real probabilities are 
not known, Bayesian updating is used for calculating these expected probabilities. Hence, 
the concept of Gittins indices is based on two basic features. First, Bayesian updating is 
used to calculate the expected probabilities of payoffs. Second, average expected payoffs 
are calculated for each arm separately according to the stopping rule approach. Gittins has  10 
   
proved that choosing at each time, t, the arm, i, with the highest Gittins index, gi(t), is the 
optimal strategy for the situation described above. 
   Strictly speaking, the use of the Gittins index is not appropriate for the situation 
faced by the players in our experiment. The reason is that the arms are not independent. 
The information given to the players implied that the probability of acceptance was weakly 
increasing in the size of the offer. This requires two modifications of the standard Gittins 
index approach. 
  First, when updating the probability of acceptance for some arm i in the context of 
our ultimatum game, a player should also update the probabilities for all other arms, as he 
knows that pi ≤ pj for each i < j. As a consequence the hypotheses in Bayesian learning 
have to be formulated for all arms jointly. Hence, a hypothesis is characterised by nine 
probabilities: p1, p2, …, p9, the probabilities assigned to each of the nine arms. The number 
of possible hypothesis is reduced by the condition p1≤p2≤p3≤p4≤p5≤p6≤p7≤p8≤p9. 
Therefore, the set of all feasible hypothesis is given by 
  } | ) ,..., , {( 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 9 2 1 p p p p p p p p p p p p H ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ = . 
The probability P(h,t) that is assigned to each hypothesis, h∈H, at each time, t, is updated 
according to Bayes' rule. The expected probability to obtain a payoff if choosing arm i is 
given by 
    ∑
∈
⋅ =
H h
i i h p t h P t E ) ( ) , ( ) (
or 
  .   (*)  ∫∫∫∫∫∫∫∫∫ =
1
000000000
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 9 2 1
987654 3 2
) , ,..., , ( ) (
pppppp p p
i i dp dp dp dp dp dp dp dp dp p t p p p P t E
  The expected probabilities defined by Equation (*) are used in the calculation of the 
Gittins indices.
8 Hence, the Gittins indices are based on expected probabilities that are 
calculated using all the available information. 
  Second, when choosing an arm, a player should not simply try the arm with the 
highest Gittins index because he should take into account as well that the outcome with 
that arm will provide useful information about the other arms (as, according to Equation (*), 
                     
     8 This integral can be calculated in closed form for each possible history. However, for reasons of 
convenience we will do this numerically.  11 
   
the expected payoffs of other arms change when using a given arm). No optimal strategy 
is known in the literature taking this second point into account.
9 
  Therefore, we will compute adjusted Gittins indices (taking the first modification into 
account), and then let players simply choose the arm with the highest Gittins index. Hence, 
we obtain an approximation of optimal behavior. This approximation deviates from optimal 
behavior only by the fact that it assumes the expectation for the average payoffs of all 
other arms to remain constant while repeatedly choosing one arm. Since this deviation is 
similar for all arms, the ranking of the Gittins indices should be little influenced by this 
approximation. 
  The Gittins indices are calculated as described in the literature (see Gittins [1979, 
1989]). At each time, t, for each arm, i, the stopping rule is calculated that leads to the 
highest average payoff for repeatedly choosing this arm. This is done through backward 
induction on all possible sequences of outcomes for repeatedly choosing arm i. Whenever 
continuing the choice of arm i decreases the average payoff, the choice is stopped. The 
expected probability Ei(t) of arm i to lead to a positive payoff is calculated at each time, t, 
according to Equation (*). The probability P(h,t) for each hypothesis, h, is updated 
according to Bayes' rule. This means that 
∑
∈
⋅
⋅
= +
H h
i t p p p P p
t p p p P p
t p p p P
) , ,..., , (
) , ,..., , (
) 1 , ,..., , (
9 2 1
9 2 1 1
9 2 1  
holds if arm i is chosen at time t and a positive outcome results and that 
∑
∈
⋅ −
⋅ −
= +
H h
i t p p p P p
t p p p P p
t p p p P
) , ,..., , ( ) 1 (
) , ,..., , ( ) 1 (
) 1 , ,..., , (
9 2 1
9 2 1 1
9 2 1  
holds if arm i is chosen at time t and an outcome of zero results. The initial prior is that 
each hypothesis, h, is equally likely. 
 
4.2 Modeling boundedly rational learning 
  To put the adjusted Gittins index approach further into perspective, we now describe 
two models of boundedly rational learning. 
  With reinforcement learning we assume that players A have no understanding of 
                     
     9 To calculate optimal behavior in such a situation requires to examine all possible sequences of 
actions, their potential outcomes, and the respective probabilities, which is computationally not 
feasible.  12 
   
game theory, the structure of the ultimatum game, or the behavior of players B. Players A are 
boundedly rational agents who behave adaptively to their environment. They simply try 
actions, and are in the future more likely to choose those offers that had been more 
reinforced (through higher payoffs) in the past. One can imagine players A playing with a 
multi-armed bandit, where different arms might give different payoffs, and players A do not 
know at the start which is the best arm to pull. The basic reinforcement learning model is as 
follows (see also Roth & Erev [1995]): At time t=1 each player has an initial propensity to 
choose his ith arm given by some real number qi(1).  We assume qj(1) = q(1) for each j, and 
Σqj(1) = 10 (following Roth & Erev [1995]). If a player plays arm i at time t, and receives a 
payoff of z, then the propensity to choose arm i is updated by setting qi(t+1)=qi(t)+z, while for 
all other arms j, qj(t+1)=qj(t). The probability that the player selects his ith arm at time t is pi(t) 
= qi(t)/Σqj(t), where the sum is over all the available arms j. Thus, given the reinforcements for 
all offers, a player chooses (with some experimentation) his most reinforced offer. Notice that 
in the reinforcement learning model players ignore the interdependence of the arms. 
  Players A who behave according to learning direction theory (see, e.g., Selten & 
Stoecker [1986]) look at the outcome of the most recent period, and reason in which 
direction a better offer could have been found. They, then, simply adjust their current offer 
into that direction. More specifically, if a player A found an offer i was rejected at time t, then 
at time t+1 he will offer i+1 to player B (unless offer i equaled the maximal possible offer). If, 
on the other hand, offer i was accepted at time t, then at time t+1 he will offer i-1 to player B 
(unless offer i equaled the minimal possible offer). Notice that a player learning according to 
learning direction theory can be seen as seeking myopically for a best-response against his 
latest opponent, and that implicitly he takes the interdependence of the arms into account. 
 
 
5.  Predicted dynamics for learning theories 
  We first consider the predicted choices for the model of optimal learning based on 
the adjusted Gittins indices, adjusted to take into account the interdependence of the arms 
in our ultimatum game. 
 
 
 
  13 
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Figure 4.  Theoretical prediction of the average behavior using adjusted Gittins indices 
 
Figure 4 shows the average behavior of the model of optimal learning over 100 runs for 
the three different treatments. We make the following observations. First, the initial choice 
is 4. This is due to the fact that, according to the initial probabilities for the different 
hypotheses, the fourth arm has to the highest Gittins index in the first round. Second, 
differences between the treatments emerge early on, with the ult3 treatment showing an 
increase in average offers, the ult7 treatment more of a decline, and the ult5 treatment 
somewhere in between. Third, after the initial learning phase there is no further downward 
trend, and no convergence to the optimal minimal offer. The optimal choice (an offer of 1) 
is chosen with probability zero in all three treatments after 100 rounds, and the average 
offer only falls below 4 for treatment ult7. 
  We draw two conclusions from these observations. First, the situation faced by the 
players in our ultimatum game experiment is such that even with optimal learning no 
convergence to the optimal offer of 1 takes place within 100 rounds. Second, the predicted 
behavior of the model of optimal learning shows qualitative similarities with the actual 
experimental data. This concerns in particular, the initial choices, the early emergence of 
differences between the treatments, and the lack of convergence to the optimal offer. 
  There is, however, also some qualitative difference between the predicted behavior 
of the model of optimal learning and the experimental data.  In the experimental data we  14 
   
observe a weak downward trend, whereas the model of optimal learning does not show a 
trend at all. The reason for the lack of a downward trend towards the optimal offer with the 
model of optimal learning is a lack of experimentation by these players. Given the structure 
of the ultimatum game, each outcome provides not only information about the probability 
behind the chosen arm but also about the probabilities behind the other arms because the 
probabilities depend on each other. As a result, experimentation by actually trying other 
arms is relatively less attractive than in the case of independent arms, and the players 
tend to stick more to their choices. In the experimental data, we see that the players tend 
to experiment more than in the model of optimal learning, but not enough to learn to 
choose the optimal minimal offer. 
  To gain some further insights where we should expect learning to lead to in the 
ultimatum game experiment, we now consider the predicted behavior of a number of 
learning models that deviate from the optimal one. 
  The above analysis of the model of optimal learning has shown that players are 
unable to learn to make the optimal offer because exploration is not sufficiently attractive. 
This is caused by the interdependence of the probabilities of the arms. Furthermore, the 
experiment shows that people experiment more than predicted by the above modelling. 
Hence, it might be conjectured that perhaps people neglect the information about the 
relationship between the arms and actually treat them as independent. This leads to the 
standard Gittins index approach. That is, there is a separate set of hypotheses for each 
arm. The hypotheses for arm i are given by all possible probabilities pi. The initial beliefs 
are that each hypothesis is equally likely. This leads to an initial prediction of 0.50 for each 
arm to lead to a positive outcome. The expected probability for each arm is determined 
only by the experience that has been made with this arm in the past. On the basis of the 
probabilities that result from Bayesian updating, the Gittins indices are calculated for each 
arm. Then, the arm which offers the highest Gittins index is chosen. 
  Figure 5 shows the average behavior for 100 runs of the standard Gittins index 
approach, neglecting the interdependence of the arms. We make the following 
observations. First, the initial offer made is 1. This is due to the unbiased priors, attaching 
a probability of acceptance of 0.50 to each arm. Second, the early learning effect leads to 
increased offers, with differences between the three treatments emerging. Third, this is 
followed by a weak downward trend, with only about half of the players making the optimal  15 
   
                    
minimal offer in the end (47%, 56% and 64% for the ult3, ult5 and ult7 treatments 
respectively), although they had all started there in the first round.
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Figure 5.  Theoretical prediction of the average behavior using Gittins indices 
 
  Hence, for this learning model that neglects the interdependence between the arms 
we see again that the players do not really learn to make the minimal offer, and, again, 
there are some qualitative similarities with the actual experimental data. The latter applies 
in particular to the weak downward trend. 
It might be that the actual players in the experiment start out taking into account 
correctly the information about the situation (the interdependence of the arms, as predicted 
by the adjusted Gittins index approach), when they have no other information. However, 
as time progresses they increasingly neglect this information about the situation (being 
boundedly rational), and they start experimenting more and more with different arms (as 
predicted by the standard Gittins index approach). 
This leads us to consider the predicted dynamics of the two boundedly rational 
models of learning presented in section 4; not so much to test which model fits the 
 
     10 The fact that there is more of a downward trend towards the optimal minimal offer may seem 
counter-intuitive, as this model makes less use of the available information than the model of 
optimal learning analyzed above.  16 
   
                    
experimental data best, but to get a better idea as to where we should expect learning to 
lead to in the ultimatum game experiment. 
Figure 6 shows the average offers for 1000 players using reinforcement learning as in 
Roth & Erev [1995]. We observe the following. First, the initial choices are about 5. Second, 
gradually differences between the treatments emerge. Third, there is a weak downward 
trend, and in none of the treatments is the optimal minimal offer approached. 
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Figure 6.  Theoretical prediction of the average behavior using reinforcement learning 
 
Figure 7 shows the average offers for 1000 learning direction theory players. We 
observe the following. First, the initial offers are again around 5. Second, after a steep initial 
learning effect, the average offers are constant in each treatment.
11 Third, during this initial 
learning phase, marked differences between the treatments emerge. 
Hence, we can conclude that the situation faced by the players in an ultimatum game 
is such that also players learning according to these models of boundedly rational behavior 
would not learn to make the optimal minimal offer. Moreover, these models of boundedly 
rational learning display some qualitative similarities with the actual experimental data. This 
concerns in particular the differences between the treatments and the lack of a clear trend 
towards the optimal minimal offer. Interestingly, similar to what we observed with the 
 
     11 This is not surprising given that this is a discrete Markov process. Notice also that the stationary  17 
   
adjusted and standard Gittins indices, the reinforcement learning model, which does not take 
any interdependence of the offers into account, predicts more of a downward trend than 
learning direction theory, which is based on an assumed interdependence of the offers.
12 
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Figure 7.  
(..continued) 
Theoretical prediction of the average behavior using learning direction theory 
 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
  This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we designed a laboratory 
experiment of a stylized ultimatum game, in which we abstract from the coevolutionary 
aspects of adaptive behavior in a standard ultimatum game experiment, and in which there is 
also no scope for altruism or fairness considerations. That is, we organized an experiment 
that matches the situation studied in multi-armed bandit problems. The behavior of the 
receiving players B is fixed from the outset in such a way that making the minimal offer of  1 
is optimal. We show that even if the learning task for the proposing players A is made as 
easy as possible, while maintaining realistic assumptions concerning the behavior of players 
distributions of offers are independent from the initial guesses. 
     12 We also considered a 2-stage model combining reinforcement learning and learning direction. 
This model has two different levels of learning. At the base level a player learns which offer to make. 
He can do this using either reinforcement learning or using learning direction theory. At the higher 
level a player learns which of these two modes of learning to use. This model gives a rather good fit 
for the average offers in each of the three treatments.  18 
   
                    
B, players A do not really learn this, notwithstanding a learning opportunity of 100 periods. 
Average offers are coming down, but very slowly. Hence, the lack of convergence to the 
subgame perfect equilibrium offer in ultimatum game experiments is not necessarily related 
to coevolutionary aspects of learning or to fairness considerations.  
  Second, we show that the lack of convergence to the optimal minimal offer is 
inherent in the learning task faced by players A, independent from the learning of players 
B. Analyzing a range of learning theories (from optimal learning based on the Gittins index 
to boundedly rational learning) in a setup that matches exactly the experimental design, we 
show why one should not expect convergence to the optimal offer, not even if the learning 
task is made as easy as possible.
13 That is, we offer a theoretical explanation for the 
experimentally observed lack of convergence to the optimal offer. 
  Third, although the objective of this paper is not to find the learning model that fits 
the experimental data best, our analysis does yield some insights into the actual learning 
behavior of the experimental subjects. Their initial choices suggest that they are 
reasonably good at taking the structure of the choice situation they face into account (in 
particular the interdependence of the offers), as their initial choices are consistent with the 
unbiased guesses of the optimal learning model. But these initial guesses happen to be far 
away from the real probabilities that actually determine the optimal minimal offer. The 
weak downward trend in the data suggests that the experimental subjects increasingly 
forget the initial information about this interdependence between the offers, and continue 
to experiment, as predicted by those learning models that assume independent arms. 
Although this implies more experimentation than predicted by the model of optimal 
learning, and this helps to overcome misleading initial guesses, convergence towards the 
optimal minimal offer takes place only very partly.
14 
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Appendix: Instructions to the players 
 
Introduction 
•  This is a decision experiment. The instructions are simple, and if you pay attention, you can 
gain a reasonable amount of money. From now on till the end of the experiment you are not 
allowed to communicate with each other. If you have a question, please raise your hand. You 
are not allowed to use paper, pen, calculator, or any other material not provided by the 
organizers of the experiment. 
•  Each of you will play repeatedly the same basic game. Before explaining how often, and with 
whom you will play this game, we will first explain the basic game as such. 
 
The Basic Game 
•  There are two players: player A, and player B. Player A has a pie cut in 9 equal slices. Player 
A makes a proposal to player B concerning the distribution of the pie. Player A can offer to 
player B from 1 up to 9 slices. Only whole slices are allowed. Player B can do 2 things. First, 
player B can accept the proposal of player A, which will then be carried out, player B getting 
the number of slices proposed by player A, and player A keeping the rest of the pie. Second, 
player B can reject the proposal of player A, in which case the pie perishes immediately, and 
both players will get nothing. 
•  Example: if player A proposes to give player B 1 slice, and player B accepts, then player B's 
payoff will be 1 slice, and player A will keep 8 slices. If, however, player B rejects the proposal,  20 
   
then the payoff for both players will be 0 slices. 
 
 
The Experiment 
•  You will play the same basic game for 100 rounds. In each round you will play the role of the 
proposer: player A. Each round you will be matched `at random' with some player B. You will 
never play more than once against the same player B. 
•  The players B with whom you will be matched are drawn from a large population of Artificially 
Intelligent agents, making their decisions using some computer algorithm. 
•  Each of those players B's behavior is systematic in the following sense: If a specific player B 
has accepted an offer x then that player B would have accepted as well any offer greater than 
x. And if offer x had been rejected by that player B, so would have been all offers smaller than 
x. Of course, different players B might have different opinions about which offers are 
acceptable or not. The players B do not change their behavior over time. 
•  During the experiment, your computer screen will be divided into 2 windows. The upper 
window will give you general messages, ask for input, etc. The lower window will display the 
history of your experiment. This window will be scrollable (using the arrows ↑ and ↓), such that 
you have always access to the complete history. The history will list all rounds, the identity of 
the specific player B you were matched with, the offer you made, player B's response, and the 
resulting payoff for you. 
•  To make your offer, please enter a number. Remember that only integer values from 1 to 9 
can be chosen. Please, before pressing Enter, always make sure that you did not make a 
typing-error. 
•  There is no time limit for your decisions. 
 
Payment 
•  You will be paid according to the total payoffs you realized. For each slice of a pie gained you 
will get 83.3 Lire. At the end of the experiment, we will add up your payoffs, and calculate your 
monetary rewards. This will be done in a separate room, so you will not see what other players 
earned. 
 